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An Economic Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol
Abstract
Global climate change represents a serious im pending issue that must be addressed in the present, not the
distant future, in order to avoid irreversible, adverse consequences. Due to externalities— intertemporal and
locational—markets will not reach an efficient outcome. Present generations bear the cost of reducing
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and do not experience the negative repercussions of global climate change,
while future generations reap the benefits of avoiding global warming without enduring the initial monetary
cost of emission reductions. Also, since the stratosphere is a public good for the entire world, the free rider
problem occurs on a global scale (Rao, 2000). Each country has an enticing incentive to allow other nations to
reduce GHG emissions without contributing to emission reduction efforts themselves. Due to these
inevitable externalities, government intervention and international cooperation is not only justifiable but a
necessity.
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I.  Introduction
Global climate change represents a serious impending issue that must be addressed in thepresent, not the distant future, in order to
avoid irreversible, adverse consequences.  Due to ex-
ternalities—intertemporal and locational—markets will
not reach an efficient outcome.  Present generations
bear the cost of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions and do not experience the negative repercus-
sions of global climate change, while future genera-
tions reap the benefits of avoiding global warming with-
out enduring the initial monetary
cost of emission reductions.  Also,
since the stratosphere is a public
good for the entire world, the free
rider problem occurs on a global
scale (Rao, 2000).  Each country
has an enticing incentive to allow
other nations to reduce GHG emis-
sions without contributing to emis-
sion reduction efforts themselves.
Due to these inevitable externalities, government in-
tervention and international cooperation is not only
justifiable but a necessity.
The Kyoto Protocol reflects an attempt to
correct these externalities by imposing GHG emis-
sion reduction standards upon current generations,
thereby combating global climate change.  Unfortu-
nately, this treaty fails to present a valid solution to
global warming.  The Kyoto Protocol neglects eco-
nomic as well as scientific realities, and therefore,
qualifies as a fundamentally flawed treaty.  Neverthe-
less, global warming represents an inevitable, formi-
dable threat to human welfare that merits a pro-ac-
tive approach characterized by efficiency, cost-effec-
tiveness, flexibility, and equitability.
II. Background
Global climate change results, according to a
widely accepted scientific consensus, from the accu-
mulation of GHG’s in the atmosphere, which absorb
infrared radiation, causing global temperature to rise.
Scientists hypothesize with a considerable amount of
evidence that the burning of fossil fuels, which emit
carbon dioxide (CO
2
), contributes to the increasing
concentrations of GHG’s in the atmosphere and,
th efore, creates global climate change (Rao, 2000).
The exact effect of increasing average global tem-
peratures remains uncertain, but
simulations project rising of the sea
level, unstable weather patterns,
extension of climate-sensitive dis-
eases, and disruption of agricultural
productivity (Chandler, 1999).
The scientific community predicts
that the mean global temperature
will rise 3°C to 4°C over the next
century if GHG emissions continue
to increase unabated (Easterbrook, 2001).
Considering the potential for drastic, irrevers-
ible consequences, international policy should reflect
he precautionary principle, which implies society is
risk-averse and ensures against the possibility of a
global warming catastrophe (Kellow, 1998).  There-
fore, despite the lack of complete scientific evidence,
global warming represents a formidable threat to hu-
man welfare and merits global action.
As a result of this growing, widespread con-
cern of global climate change, developed nations met
in December of 1997 and formed the Kyoto Proto-
col,  treaty intended to counteract the trend of glo-
bal warming by instituting legally binding GHG emis-
sion reduction standards.  Under the Kyoto Proto-
col, Annex I nations, which encompass 39 high in-
An Economic Analysis of  the Kyoto
Protocol
Alexis Manning
“The Kyoto Protocol ne-
glects economic as well
as scientific realities, and
therefore, qualifies as a
fundamentally flawed
treaty.”
80
Alexis Manning
The Park Place Economist Volume X
come, developed countries, must reduce their emis-
sions of six GHG’s, including CO
2
, methane, nitrous
oxide, hyrdoflorocarbons, polyflorocarbons, and sul-
fur dioxide by an average of 5% from 1990 levels.
The treaty stipulates that this reduction occur during
the commitment period extending from 2008-2012.
The Kyoto Protocol will become effective once 55
participating parties, representing at least 55% of CO
2
emissions, ratify the treaty (Rao, 2000)
III. Benefit-Cost Analysis of the Kyoto
Protocol
Despite the treaty’s many flaws, the Kyoto
Protocol allows several innovative, theoretically cost-
effective approaches to attaining the emission reduc-
tion quotas instead of relying upon the standard com-
mand and control approach.  Unfortunately, many of
these strategies remain dangerously vague, and the
treaty compromises economic theory in favor of poli-
tics.  In theory, the Protocol permits a considerable
amount of flexibility in achieving these emission re-
ductions.  This flexibility, in turn, could greatly reduce
the total cost of obtaining the desired emission reduc-
tions.  However, in practice, potentially flexible mecha-
nisms become inflexible due to restrictions and regu-
lations (Tol, 1998).
The treaty allows an international emission
reduction trading system, which creates a limited glo-
bal market for emission reduction units among Annex
I countries (Rao, 2000).  Countries with a lower mar-
ginal cost (MC) of reduction will reduce their emis-
sions and sell their excess emission reduction credits
to countries with a higher MC of reduction.  There-
fore, MC’s will equalize; countries will engage in mu-
tually beneficial transactions to achieve emission re-
ductions in the most cost effective method possible.
The existence of tradable emission reduction units
potentially could drastically reduce the total cost of
Kyoto’s standards.
However, considering that Kyoto only legally
obligates developed nations to alter GHG emissions,
the treaty limits permit trading to Annex I nations (Rao,
2000).  Since most Annex I countries have relatively
similar MC’s of emission reduction, the benefits of an
international trading system cannot be fully realized.
Although this theoretically cost effective system dem-
onstrates a less expensive method than a standard
command and control approach, this diluted permit
trading system will not approach the least cost
method.   According to a study conducted by William
Nordhaus (1998), a complete international emission
reduction trading system could reduce the massive
cost of Kyoto by a factor of nine.  However, a trad-
ing ystem restricted only to Annex I nations produces
a less impressive decline in cost, and reduces the to-
tal cost of Kyoto by less than a factor of two.  Clearly,
a globally inclusive trading system could achieve GHG
emission reduction goals in a more cost efficient man-
ner, thereby lessening the financial burden of Kyoto.
In addition, the international emission reduc-
tion trading system could drastically impact individual
economies.  Due to the increasing costs of produc-
tion in Annex I countries, companies may elect to shift
pr duction to developing nations, which will have a
substantial lower MC of production.  This shift will
negate Kyoto’s efforts to reduce global GHG emis-
sions, because firms will be able to pollute freely in
these non-Annex I nations.  Goods produced in An-
nex I nations will become more expensive, while non-
Annex I goods will become comparatively less ex-
pensive.  Consequently, Annex I nations will experi-
nce a comparative disadvantage.  Also, these per-
mits may discourage development in certain coun-
tries.  Russia and Eastern Europe will possess an ex-
cess of emission reduction credits due to the collapse
of the Soviet Union that occurred after 1990 (Tol,
1998).  Consequently, these countries will experience
a windfall and reap unearned profits.  These coun-
tries will benefit more from selling emission reduction
permits than developing efficient, environmentally
friendly policies.  Consequently, total output will de-
ase significantly, though their income will actually
increase due to large transfers from Annex I countries
(Nordhaus, 1998).  Although their GDP may reflect
prosperity, the reduction of output has serious impli-
cations for their economy.
Kyoto also permits other methods of achiev-
ing GHG emission reductions.  Through “joint imple-
mentation,” Annex I countries can achieve their emis-
sion reduction quotas by undertaking projects in other
An ex I countries to reduce GHG emissions (Chan-
dler, 1999).  However, the MC of reductions lack
s gnificant variability among these nations, and this strat-
egy will not radically mitigate the costs of Kyoto.  In
ddition, the treaty provides Annex I nations with the
opportunity to fulfill emission reduction requirements
in eveloping nations, under the “clean development
mechanism” (CDM).  The MC of reduction is signifi-
cantly lower in developing nations that will allow de-
veloped nations to capitalize off these lower cost op-
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portunities.  Developed nations can undertake projects
in developing nations, which will reduce emissions,
while encouraging technological innovation and eco-
nomic development in these underdeveloped areas
(Chandler, 1999).  Kyoto also
allows emission reduction flex-
ibility, because the treaty allows
countries to achieve emission
reduction credits through refor-
estation.  Forests qualify as emis-
sion reduction units, because
they are CO
2 
“sinks,” which absorb CO
2
 and prevent
GHG’s from entering the stratosphere.  Therefore,
the presence of forests can significantly mitigate glo-
bal climate change (Sutherland, 2000).
Kyoto contains several innovative approaches
to combating global climate change that encourage
flexibility, thereby lowering total costs.  However, the
Protocol states many of these emission reduction
mechanisms in very vague terms and limits the use of
these alternative methods.  Regardless of varying MC
of reduction, international efforts and reforestation
projects may only supplement domestic efforts
(Nordhaus, 1998).  Therefore, the Kyoto Protocol
will not achieve an efficient outcome.
Perhaps the most fundamental flaw of Kyoto
involves the lack of mandatory participation of devel-
oping nations.  The treaty fails to impose legally bind-
ing emission reduction standards upon Non-Annex I
countries, which encompass 134 developing nations
(Tol, 1998).  Some proponents of Kyoto argue that
the developed world, specifically the US and Europe,
pioneered the use of fossil fuels during industrializa-
tion and therefore, created the current global warm-
ing predicament.  Also, developed nations account
only for 20% of the global population yet emit 60%
of the world’s CO
2
 emissions (Easterbrook, 2001).
Even more alarming, the US composes only 5% of
the world population yet accounts for 30% of CO
2
emissions.  According to per capita calculations, a
Chinese person generates 1/10 of the GHG emis-
sions of an American.  Nevertheless, even the most
ardent supporters of Kyoto admit that the treaty can-
not stabilize GHG emission without meaningful par-
ticipation of developing countries, which represent
80% of the global population (Tol, 1998).
As developing nations advance, their GHG
emissions will rapidly increase due to industrial de-
velopment, which relies heavily upon high CO
2
emit-
ting fossil fuel sources, including coal.  According to
wid ly accepted projections, China will surpass the
US as the largest CO
2
emitter by 2015, and the de-
veloping world will overtake the developed world in
CO
2
 emissions by 2020 (Tol, 1998).  Therefore, the
actions of 39 Annex I nations
cannot significantly counteract
the trend of global climate
change, while 134 non-Annex I
nations continue to exponentially
increase GHG emissions
(Nordhaus, 1998).  Any
progress accomplished by developed nations will be
more than offset by increasing emissions of develop-
ing nations.  According to Nordhaus, Kyoto will only
decrease global mean temperature by 0.13°C from
the projected baseline temperature increase during
the n xt century.  This insignificant decrease in aver-
age global temperature cannot mitigate the global
warming trend.  Therefore, the Kyoto Protocol lacks
scienti ic validity.  Kyoto cannot possibly achieve its
ultimate goal of reversing the global climate change
rend.
In addition, the chosen emission reduction
targets lack any scientific or economic foundation.
The Protocol stipulates that each Annex I nation re-
duce GHG emissions by an average of 5% from 1990
levels.  These historical baseline targets lack any rela-
tio  to global CO
2
 concentrations, projected tempera-
ture increases, or MC of emission reduction (Kellow,
1998).  The Kyoto Protocol sets completely arbi-
trary emission reductions quotas, which prevent an
efficient, effective outcome.  Efficient emission reduc-
tion standards would reflect economic and scientific
factors, including GHG concentrations and MC’s of
emission reduction.
Also, the impending emission reduction tar-
get deadlines approach economic and scientific im-
possibility.  Kyoto requires the US to reduce GHG
emissions by 7% of 1990 levels.  According to pro-
jections, if emissions continue to increase at the cur-
rent rate, the US will be over 20% above 1990 CO
2
levels by 2008 (Tol, 1998).  Consequently, the US
must reduce it emissions by 27% of its projected level
in less than a decade.  The European Union (EU)
faces similar, though not quite as daunting, emission
reduction challenges as the US.  The next few years
do not constitute sufficient time to institute such dras-
tic emission reductions.
The presence of relatively uniform emission
reduction standards, without the mitigating presence
“...the US composes only
5% of the world population
yet accounts for 30% of
CO2 emissions.”
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of significant market incentives, creates very cost in-
effective results.  Standard emission reductions among
Annex I nations neglect to consider the individual cir-
cumstances of each country under the guise of equal-
ity.  Kyoto ignores factors which significantly affect a
nation’s ability to reduce domestic emissions, includ-
ing level of wealth, population growth rate, type of
energy supply, transportation system, rate of economic
growth, past investment selections, and existing infra-
structure (Kellow, 1998).  For example, the treaty
allows Eastern Europe, as well as nations included in
the former Soviet Union to benefit from their histori-
cally incredibly inefficient energy systems by using
1990 levels as a baseline (Nordhaus, 1998).  These
countries could easily reduce emissions at a minimal
cost.  Also, the collapse of the Soviet Union, which
greatly affected industry and therefore, reduced GHG
emission from 1990 levels, allows Russia a huge wind-
fall.  Russia would be able to meet its target without
any modifications of its current emission level.
Also, enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol re-
mains a perplexing, unresolved problem.  Due to the
extremely high projected cost of Kyoto, countries will
have a strong incentive to cheat.  As a result, high
transaction costs to ensure en-
forcement will add to the al-
ready burdensome cost of
Kyoto.  The treaty fails to ad-
dress the specifics of enforce-
ment and consequently, pun-
ishment.  Even more problem-
atic, there is no precedence for
a global enforcing agency of the
magnitude Kyoto requires.  Doubts arise as to the
practical possibility of implementing and enforcing
Kyoto.
More than any other factor, the unbelievably
high cost of implementing Kyoto effectively eradicates
any possible value of the treaty.  Nordhaus estimates
the global cost of Kyoto to total $828 billion (1998).
Annex I nations bear this economic burden, while non-
Annex I countries benefit, albeit comparatively insig-
nificantly.  Eastern Europe and Russia emerge as ben-
eficiaries.  However, these gains are merely transfers
from the US, due to the tradable emission reduction
credits, and do not represent true economic benefits.
If implemented, the US will bear the brunt of
Kyoto’s massive cost, paying over 2/3 of the total
global cost, which reaches approximately $517 bil-
lion (Nordhaus, 1998).  The treaty requires 2-5% of
the US’s GDP annually (Murkowski, 2000).  Imple-
menting Kyoto will cause serious economic ramifica-
tions.  By 2050, the US will transfer over $40 billion
ann ally to Russia and Eastern Europe to purchase
emission reduction permits (Nordhaus, 1998).  This
large transfer of wealth will deplete funds for capital
investment within the US and discourage domestic
growth of the economy.
In addition, energy prices will dramatically
increase.  In order to achieve Kyoto’s emission re-
uction standards domestically, the US will need to
dec ease energy consumption by raising prices, which
will eventually decrease demand.  However, the in-
elastic demand for energy predicts that prices must
drastically increase before consumers respond.  En-
ergy prices will increase by 33% by 2010.  Imple-
menting Kyoto will impose a tax on carbon exceed-
ing $250 per ton by 2050 (Nordhaus, 1998).  Kyoto
will consume an average of $2,728 of household in-
come annually, eradicate 2.4 million jobs, and de-
crease the US living standard (Murkowski, 2001).
Proponents of the treaty argue that the high
costs of global climate change justify the extremely
large price tag of the treaty.  Although the estimated
total cost of unabated global cli-
mate change varies,  relatively
conservative estimates total
$1.8 trillion, which clearly vali-
dates the devotion of resources
to combat this environmental
problem.  However, as stated
earlier, Kyoto does not effec-
tively mitigate global warming.
Kyoto’s benefits only total $0.12 trillion, while the
costs total more than $0.8 trillion.  Therefore, the
Kyoto Protocol clearly fails the benefit-cost test; the
benefit-cost ratio equals 1/7 (Nordhaus, 1998).  The
Kyoto Protocol is an extremely inefficient, cost inef-
fective approach that fails to produce results.
IV. Conclusion
Although the dynamics of global climate
change necessitates both government intervention and
i ternational cooperation, the Kyoto Protocol lacks
the ability to counteract the global warming trend but
retain  a prohibitively high price.  Both the economic
and ecological ramifications of Kyoto raise concern.
Implementing Kyoto would result in both economic
and ecological disaster.  Kyoto would cause an in-
credible amount of strain upon the US and other An-
“...enforcement of the Kyoto
Protocol remains a perplexing,
unresolved problem.  Due to
the extremely high projected
cost of Kyoto, countries will
have a strong incentive to
cheat.”
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nex I economies.  In addition to the inevitable eco-
nomic crisis, the global climate change would con-
tinue to occur at an alarming rate, aiding a possible
ecological disaster.  However, the world would lack
necessary resources to devote to combating global
climate change due to the high costs of Kyoto.  Ironi-
cally, implementing the Kyoto Protocol, a treaty de-
signed to reduce global warming, would actually in-
crease the severity of this environmental problem,
because large quantities of valuable resources would
be devoted to a fundamentally, flawed, ineffective
treaty.  Kyoto imposes a large opportunity cost upon
the world.  The financially depleted world would lack
the necessary resources to solve global climate change.
Achieving an efficient global climate change
policy is a very challenging goal, but several funda-
mental guidelines exist.  Global climate change ne-
cessitates decisive global action.  Each country will
not individually elect a globally optimal policy, be-
cause the stratosphere is a public good.  Therefore,
global climate change requires enforceable, binding
worldwide cooperation.  Both developed and devel-
oping countries must play active, meaningful roles.
Without the participation of developing nations, any
policy will be rendered ineffective.  Obviously, or
perhaps not so obviously, total benefits must outweigh
total costs.  In order to achieve a globally optimal
policy, each country must individually experience a
positive net gain.  Any successful policy must create
the proper incentives for participation, which implies
positive net benefits.  Logically, global participation
will not occur, in the absence of prohibitively high en-
forcement costs, unless each country experiences
positive benefits.  Efficiency and cost effectiveness
constitute important goals.  Ideally, the marginal cost
of emission reduction should equal the marginal ben-
efit emission reduction, which indicates efficiency.
However, practicality eliminates the possibility of com-
plete efficiency.  Nevertheless, global warming poli-
cies should strive towards efficiency.  Flexibility in
achieving reductions in GHG emission will lessen the
cost of implementing the policy and result in a more
efficient outcome.  International tradable emission
permits will promote efficiency by minimizing mar-
ginal cost as well as encouraging technological inno-
vations.  Also, reduction standards should reflect sci-
entific findings, which indicate that any policy must
actually reduce global warming, thus producing ben-
efits.  A scientifically ineffective policy wastes valu-
able resources.
Fortunately, the US faced economic and sci-
entific realities, and President George W. Bush termi-
nated Kyoto Protocol negotiations in March of 2001.
However, many Annex I nations remain in the nego-
tiations.  Although some environmentalists and politi-
cians view the US’s rejection of the treaty as short-
sighted and ignorant, the rejection of Kyoto appears
log cal and prudent, in terms of both the short and
long run.  Allocating additional resources to Kyoto, a
pr foundly flawed treaty, would represent waste of
limit d, valuable resources.  The US now possesses
he pportunity to pursue an economically and scien-
tifi ally valid alternative to the Kyoto Protocol.  As
t e largest CO
2 
emitter and an influential world power,
the US has an obligation to take a pro-active stance
tow rds climate stabilization in order to ensure the
welfare of future generations across the globe.
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